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INTRODUCTION 
 Defendant followed the victim—a stranger—in his car, rammed the 
victim’s car, and then shot at the victim 10 times. One bullet grazed the 
victim’s neck, another went into a nearby house, and eight more went into 
the victim’s car. Defendant then led police on a 22-mile car chase. Defendant 
was convicted of attempted murder, criminal mischief, and possession of a 
firearm by a restricted person.1  
 During the first and second days of trial, the trial court observed that a 
juror missed a significant amount of testimony because she was sleeping. 
                                              
1 Defendant does not challenge his failure to stop at the command of 
police, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia convictions. Br.Aplt.10. 
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Although Defendant asked the trial court to question the juror first, the court 
sua sponte dismissed the sleeping juror and replaced her with an alternate. 
The jury convicted Defendant. 
 Defendant challenges his attempted murder and criminal mischief jury 
convictions. He also challenges his possession-of-a-firearm-by-a-restricted-
person bench-trial conviction. Defendant argues that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he was the shooter.  
 But ample evidence demonstrated that Defendant was the shooter. The 
evidence showed  that Defendant stole his girlfriend’s red Chevy Malibu, that 
the Malibu was involved in the shooting, and that only one person was 
driving that car—a person that matched Defendant’s description. Inside the 
Malibu police found 10 spent shell casings from a 40-caliber handgun—the 
same number of bullet holes found at the scene and the same type of gun 
used in the shooting. And Defendant’s DNA was found on at least one of 
those spent casings.  
 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it sua sponte 
dismissed a sleeping juror without first questioning her. But the trial court 
was not required to question the sleeping juror before dismissing her, even 
though Defendant requested it. The trial court had broad discretion in 
handling the sleeping juror and nothing required the  court to question her 
-3- 
before dismissing her. Moreover, Defendant cannot show prejudice because 
he has not—and cannot show that a bias or incompetent juror sat. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 Issue 1.  Was the evidence sufficient to support Defendant’s attempted 
murder, criminal mischief, and possession of a firearm by a restricted person 
convictions?  
 Standard of Review. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this 
Court will “review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light 
most favorable to the jury’s verdict” and will reverse a conviction only if it 
determines “that the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to [the 
defendant’s guilt].” State v. Kennedy, 2015 UT App 152, ¶39, 354 P.3d 775. 
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at a bench trial, this Court 
must affirm unless, in light of the whole record, it is convinced that the 
verdict is “against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [it] otherwise reaches 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made” State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
 Issue 2. Did the trial court clearly abuse its discretion by sua sponte 
dismissing a sleeping juror and replacing that juror with the alternate without 
first questioning the juror? 
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 Standard of Review. “Granting or refusing a new trial” based upon a 
sleeping juror “is something so peculiarly within the observation, province, 
and discretion of the trial court that” an appellate court will not reverse 
“except upon a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Mellor, 272 P. 635, 639 (Utah 
1929). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of relevant facts. 
 Stephen Mecham was driving home from work on June 6, 2016, when 
Defendant—a stranger—followed Stephen, rammed his car, and then shot at 
him ten times. R571-81; see State’s Exhibit (SE)5-9,41,61.  
***** 
 The day before the shooting. Defendant’s girlfriend reported that 
Defendant had stolen her 2002 red Chevy Malibu with a yellow baby-on-
board sign in the back window, Utah license plate number E824JR. R627-29; 
SE20,21. Later that day, an officer saw Defendant driving the Malibu with no 
one else in the car. R629. When the officer tried to pull Defendant over, 
Defendant fled. R632. 
 The shooting. The next afternoon, around 3:45 pm, Stephen Mecham 
was driving his silver Chrysler 300 home from work. R422-23. As Stephen 
drove, he noticed Defendant erratically driving front of him. R569-70. 
-5- 
Initially, Stephen was relieved when Defendant pulled over so he could pass, 
but he quickly became alarmed when Defendant “jumped in right behind 
[him] and aggressively” followed him. R569-573. Stephen was so concerned 
that he did not drive home. R574. Instead, Stephen knew that a highway 
patrolman lived nearby and turned into the highway patrolman’s 
neighborhood. Id. As Stephen drove down the residential streets, Defendant 
pulled alongside Stephen and pointed a gun at him. R575. Stephen slammed 
on the brakes and reversed. R576. Defendant chased Stephen. Id. Stephen 
called 911. SE53.  
 As Stephen spoke to the 911 operator, Defendant rammed  Stephen’s 
car. R578; SE53. Stephen’s car skidded, hit a parked SUV, and rolled onto a 
lawn. R578-79; SE1b-1e. Defendant opened fire, repeatedly shooting at 
Stephen’s car. R579; SE53 (gunfire audible). Defendant backed up, changed 
the angle of his car, then continued to shoot, firing ten rounds in total. R579-
81. Defendant then fled in the Malibu. R589. 
 One bullet grazed Stephen’s neck. R581; SE40-41. Another went into a 
house. SE9. Eight bullets went into Stephen’s car. R818; SE2,5-8.  
 After the shooting stopped, Stephen “pried” his car door open and got 
out. R851. Police arrived soon after and began immediately looking for 
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Defendant. R666-68 (incident occurred at 4:13, officer arrived near scene at 
4:21). Stephen was transported to the hospital. R582. 
 Police investigation. Stephan could not identify the Malibu’s driver, 
but saw only one person in the car—a Hispanic male with a heavily tattooed 
arm. R571-73. 
 A neighbor, Jennifer Wood, heard four consecutive gun shots and went 
outside. R586-87. Wood saw that the gunfire was coming from a “red car.” 
R587. She saw the red car back up  and then she heard “four or five more 
shots.” R587-89. Wood saw the red car make a U-turn, speed past her, and 
“bl[o]w through” an intersection. R589. Wood identified Defendant’s 
girlfriend’s car as the car involved in the shooting. R590; SE21. She described 
the car as “crushed in” on the front passenger side, with a white Utah license 
plate, and a baby-on-board sign in the back window. Id.  
 Celia Tafoya was driving in the area at the time of the shooting. R637-
38. Tafoya saw the Malibu intentionally hit Stephen’s car, and the Malibu’s 
driver shoot at Stephen’s car. R640-42. Tafoya could not see who was driving 
because she ducked down inside her car and covered her daughter when the 
gunfire erupted. R640. Tafoya did see that only one person was in the 
Malibu—the driver. Id. 
-7- 
 Kathleen Henry was also driving in the area at the time. R601. She first 
heard a “great big ka-bang” or “screech” then saw the driver of a “red car” 
shooting at Stephan’s car. R601,607. She saw that the red car’s driver “just 
kept firing” at Stephen, about five to seven shots. R604. Henry drove past the 
red car and in her rear-view mirror saw the red car make a U-turn, then saw 
it drive past her. R605. Henry saw the red car run the red light at the 
intersection and a piece of it fly off. Id.  
 Henry called 911 and followed the red car. Id. As she followed, she 
relayed the red car’s location to the 911 operator. R606. She also saw the red 
car’s driver stop in the middle of the street, pick up the car’s bumper that had 
fallen off, and put the bumper in the backseat. Id. 
 Officer Smith interviewed Henry about thirty minutes after the 
shooting. R653; see R668. Based on his interview, Officer Smith recovered a 
headlight at the intersection. R653; SE10,11. 
 Henry described the red car’s driver as having a “round face,” “really 
dark eyes,” “short, really dark hair,” and a moustache. R604. Two days later, 
police asked Henry to view a photo array. R608; SE50; Cf. R567; SE50 
(shooting occurred two days before lineup shown). The photo array 
contained six photos; photo five was Defendant. R1009. Henry picked photo 
two out of the array but was not positive that the photo was the driver. R609. 
-8- 
She explained that photo two “resembles the offender in this case but I am 
not positive.” R609; SE50.  
 Almost immediately after the shooting, Officer Benjamin Watson was 
dispatched to the scene and began looking for Defendant. R703-04; see 666-
68,995 (officers dispatched minutes after shooting). Officer Watson saw 
Defendant—a Hispanic male with the word “eighteen” tattooed on his upper 
lip—driving the red Chevy Malibu with a missing bumper and headlight and 
a baby-on-board sign in the back window. R703-044; SE35-37,55. Officer 
Watson followed Defendant, radioing other officers to set up a containment 
area. R705. A containment area involves “surround[ing] the suspect in an 
organized manner so that [officers can] effectively apprehend the suspect.” 
Id. Officer Watson followed Defendant for approximately 14 and a-half miles 
as Defendant sped along I-215and surface streets, then ran a red light and 
drove through a neighborhood. R705-718; SE46,47,55. Watson eventually lost 
Defendant. R718; SE55.   
 About the time that Watson lost Defendant, Detective Tan saw 
Defendant—a Hispanic male with a moustache—drive the Malibu “right by 
[him].” R733. Tan followed Defendant for approximately 8 miles as 
Defendant sped through neighborhoods, drove on the median, drove into on-
coming traffic, and onto the freeway—reaching speeds of 95 miles per hour. 
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R726-50; SE49,56. Defendant eventually exited the freeway and drove to the 
Harmony Apartment Complex where his aunt lived. R750-51; see R447. At the 
Harmony Apartments, Defendant abandoned the Malibu in the middle of the 
road and led officers on a short foot chase through the complex. R751-56; 
SE56.  
 Sergeant Gray, who had also been pursuing Defendant in a separate 
marked police car, cut Defendant off in the apartment complex and arrested 
him. R751-56; SE56.  
 The entire incident—from Stephan’s 911 call until Defendant’s arrest—
lasted approximately two hours. R668. 
 During a search incident to arrest, officers found methamphetamine in 
Defendant’s sock and drug paraphernalia in Defendant’s pocket. R556. 
  Officers also searched the car Defendant was driving—the red or 
maroon Chevy Malibu with the yellow baby-on-board sign hanging in the 
back window, Utah license plate E824JR. R780. The exterior of the Malibu had 
extensive damage. SE35-37. It was missing the front bumper and a headlight. 
R780; SE23,32-37. It was crushed in on one side with silver paint transfer and 
had a broken back window. Id. Officers found the Malibu’s front bumper in 
the backseat. R780. They also found glass shards on the backseat floor. SE32a. 
Officers found a 32-caliber bullet, a 40-caliber bullet, and 10 spent shell 
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casings from a 40-caliber gun on the driver’s side floorboard. R781, 835-37; 
SE28-32(a).  
 Crime scene technicians recovered 5 slugs from the shooting scene. 
R819-25,876; SE12-16. A slug is “a bullet that has been fired.” R819. Two slugs 
were found in the front of Stephen’s car and two were found in the back of 
the car on the driver’s side. R819-21; SE14A-16. One slug was recovered from 
the porch of a nearby house. R876. The slugs were all fired from a 40-caliber 
gun. R843,872. 
 The crime scene technician also recovered glass shards from the 
shooting scene. R825. Those  shards  matched glass shards recovered from 
the Malibu’s backseat floorboard. R833,838. 
 The crime scene technician also tested the detached bumper for 
fingerprints. R844. A partial palm print was recovered from the bumper, but 
it did not match Defendant. Id.  
 The shell casings and live ammunition recovered from the Malibu were 
tested for touch DNA. R880-89; 940-65; SE51-52. The crime scene technician 
processed the shell casings and live ammunition by individually rinsing the 
casing or bullet in a buffer solution and running that buffer solution through 
an M-Vac filter. R880-90. The M-Vac filter is a designed to “catch a cell where 
the DNA is stored” and filter out the other cells. R887. One filter was used for 
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all the shell casings and ammunition. R891. That M-Vac filter was then sent 
to Sorenson Labs for analysis. R892; SE51,52. The DNA analyst found that the 
DNA collected by the M-Vac filter from the casing and bullets matched 
Defendant’s DNA profile. R965,975; SE51-52.  
 As Defendant awaited trial, he called his girlfriend, the Malibu’s 
owner, from jail. R994. In their conversations, Defendant never said that he 
loaned Malibu to someone else, misplaced the Malibu, or that someone else 
was driving the car. Id. 
B. Summary of proceedings and disposition of the court. 
 Defendant was initially charged with seventeen counts: attempted 
murder, a first-degree felony; felony discharge of a firearm and possession of 
a firearm by a restricted person; both second-degree felonies; failure to 
respond to an officer’s signal to stop, criminal mischief, and ten counts of 
felony discharge of a firearm, all third-degree felonies; failure to stop at 
command of an officer and possession of a controlled substance, both class-
A misdemeanors; criminal mischief and possession of drug paraphernalia, 
both class-B misdemeanors, and violation of operator duties for an accident 
involving property damages, a class-C misdemeanor. R1-6.  
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 Directed verdict motion. At the close of the State’s case, Defendant 
moved for a directed verdict. R1026. Defendant argued that the State had not 
proven that he was the shooter. R1027-29. 
 The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. R1030. The trial court found 
that the State had presented “quite substantial evidence . . . [from] which the 
jury could infer the defendant is the one who did this.” Id. The court 
explained that the eyewitness testimony combined with the testimony that 
Defendant evaded police the day before in the same car involved in the 
shooting and led officers on an “extraordinary chase” led to the inference that 
Defendant fired the shots. R1032. 
 The defense. Defendant did not testify. He argued that he was not the 
shooter and that the State’s evidence was insufficient to identify him as the 
shooter. R1114-29.  
 Sleeping juror. On the second day of trial, the trial court sua sponte 
dismissed Juror 16. R789-90. 
 On the second day of trial in the middle of the second witness, the trial 
court informed the parties that it was taking break. R742. After the jury left 
the courtroom, the court explained that it took the break because “Juror No.16 
keeps falling asleep.” R743. The court explained that it had observed Juror 16 
repeatedly fall asleep on the first day of trial and that was the reason the court 
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took some breaks. Id. The court explained that it was “a little concerned [that] 
right in the middle of [a] presentation that usually would take someone’s 
attention,” Juror 16 is “noticeably falling asleep.” Id.  
 After the break, the court informed the parties outside the jury’s 
presence that it was “going to dismiss Juror No. 16” at the end of that day’s 
testimony. R744. The court explained that it had thought about the issue more 
and the clerk and bailiff informed the court that Juror 16 was sleeping for “a 
significant period of time.” Id.  
 Defense counsel objected, informing the court that they had not noticed 
that Juror 16 was sleeping. R744-45. The court explained that it and its staff 
had watched Juror 16 sleep during both days of trial “over a significant 
period of time.” R745.  
 At the end of testimony for the day, defense counsel asked the court to 
question Juror 16 to see if she missed any testimony before dismissing her. 
R789. The State did not object. Id. The court nevertheless denied the request. 
Id.  
 The court then dismissed Juror 16, explaining that it had watched her 
“fall asleep a couple of times.” R789-90. The court explained that it wanted to 
be cautious and not have an error in the trial. Id. When the court told Juror 16 
the reason for her dismissal, she nodded in affirmance. R792. 
-14- 
 After Juror 16 left, defense counsel renewed their objection. R789. The 
court again explained that it decided to dismiss Juror 16 because she fell 
asleep multiple times on the first and second days of trial. R790. The court 
also explained that it was concerned about continuing the trial because the 
juror was clearly missing information, both the clerk and bailiff had observed 
Juror 16 sleeping, and the court timed its breaks try to keep Juror 16 awake. 
Id. The court explained that this was not a situation where Juror 16 fell asleep 
once where she “kind of dozed off for a minute.” R791. Instead, the court 
explained that Juror 16 missed “significant parts of the trial.” Id. The court 
explained that “it doesn’t matter” if Juror 16 knew that she missed parts of 
the trial or not, the “fact is that” both the court and the court’s staff “observed 
her miss[] significant parts of the trial.” Id. 
 Defense counsel explained that they did not want Juror 16 released 
because she was “strategically selected.” R791-92. The court explained again 
that questioning Juror 16 would not be persuasive because it was so obvious 
that she had been sleeping and had missed a “significant amount” of the trial. 
R792.  
 Juror 16 was replaced with the alternate, Juror 22. R1199. Juror 22 was 
present for the entire trial.  
 Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict of on all counts. R308. 
-15- 
 Bench trial. A separate bench trial was held on Defendant’s 
possession-of-a-dangerous-weapon-by-a-restricted-person charge. R1145-47. 
After the prosecutor presented evidence that Defendant was a restricted 
person, the court found him guilty on that charge. R1146-47.  
 Following his jury and bench trials, Defendant moved to merge his 
eleven felony-discharge-of-a-firearm convictions with his attempted-murder 
conviction. R347-357. Over the State’s objection, the court granted 
Defendant’s motion. R370-376,1174. 
 Sentencing. The court then sentenced Defendant. For his attempted 
murder conviction, the court sentenced Defendant to three years to life in 
prison. R388. For his failure to stop at the command of a police officer, the 
court sentenced Defendant to zero to five years in prison. Id. For his criminal 
mischief conviction, the court sentenced Defendant to zero to five years in 
prison. Id. For his possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, 
the court sentenced Defendant to one to fifteen years in prison. Id. For his 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia 
convictions, the court sentenced Defendant to 180 days in jail. R389. The court 
ordered that Defendant’s sentences run consecutively. Id. 
 Defendant timely appeals. R397. 
-16- 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Point I. Defendant argues that insufficient evidence supports his 
attempted-murder and criminal-mischief jury convictions and possession-of-
a-dangerous-weapon-by-a-restricted-person bench-trial conviction. 
Defendant specifically argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that 
he was the shooter.  
 Defendant’s claim fails. The evidence showed that Defendant had 
stolen his girlfriend’s red Chevy Malibu, the same Malibu was involved in 
the shooting, and only one person was driving the car—a person that 
matched Defendant’s description. Inside the Malibu, police found 10 spent 
shell casings from a 40-caliber handgun—the same number of  bullets holes 
found at the scene and the same type of gun used in the shooting. And 
Defendant’s DNA was found on at least one of those spent casings. This was 
sufficient evidence to support his convictions.  
 Point II. Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
when it sua sponte dismissed a sleeping juror without first questioning her 
about what she believed she missed while sleeping. Defendant argues that a 
an outcome-determinative standard applies and that he was prejudiced 
under that standard. Defendant’s claim fails.  
-17- 
 Defendant relies on the wrong prejudice standard. To prevail, 
Defendant must show that a biased or incompetent juror sat. On this record, 
Defendant cannot show that the alternate juror was biased or incompetent.  
 Defendant also cannot show that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion by sua sponte dismissing the sleeping juror after it observed the 
juror sleep through the first two days of trial, missing material information 
that would prevent her from being able to render a verdict.  
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The State produced ample evidence to link Defendant to the 
shooting. 
 Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his 
attempted-murder, criminal-mischief, and possession-of-a-dangerous 
weapon-by-a-restricted-person convictions. Br.Aplt.10-16. He specifically 
argues that his matching a “general description” of the car’s driver, his 
connection to the car, his DNA found on bullet casings inside  the car, and his 
flight from police were not sufficient evidence to prove that he was the 
shooter. Br.Aplt.11-14.  
 Defendant’s claim fails. The evidence showed, among other things, 
that Defendant had stolen his girlfriend’s red Chevy Malibu, the Malibu was 
involved in the shooting, and only one person was driving the car—a person 
-18- 
that matched Defendant’s description. Inside the Malibu, police found 10 
spent shell casings from a 40-caliber handgun—the same number of  bullets 
holes found at the scene and the same type of gun used in the shooting. And 
Defendant’s DNA was found on at least one of those spent casings.  
A. Ample evidence supported the jury’s attempted-murder and 
criminal-mischief verdicts.  
 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court gives 
“substantial deference to the jury.” State v. Ashcraft, 2015 UT 5, ¶18, 349 P.3d 
664 (quotation and citation omitted). This Court “review[s] the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict.” State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177, 299 P.3d 892 (quotation and 
citation omitted). The existence of “contradictory evidence or of conflicting 
inferences does not warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict.” State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). So reviewed, evidence will not support a jury verdict 
only when it “is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime.” State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) 
(quotation and citation omitted). Thus, this Court must affirm if “some 
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of 
the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 
¶177 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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 It makes no difference whether the evidence is solely circumstantial. 
It is “well-settled” that circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish 
guilt. State v. MacNeill, 2017 UT App 48, ¶57, 397 P.3d 626 (citation and 
quotation omitted). The State may present “a mosaic 
of circumstantial evidence that considered as a whole constitutes proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
“Circumstantial evidence may even be more convincing than direct 
testimony.” State v. Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139, 140 (Utah 1978).  
  It is also “well-established” that identification can be proven from 
circumstantial evidence. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ¶23 n.2, 354 P.3d 791. 
A “direct, in-court identification is not required.” Id. A “witness need not 
physically point out a defendant so long as the evidence is sufficient to permit 
the inference that the person on trial was the person who committed the 
crime.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted); see also United States v. Smith, 134 
F.3d 384, *3, 1998 WL 33862 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[T]here is no requirement of an 
in-court identification when other evidence permits the inference that the 
defendant is the person who committed the offense.”); United States v. Weed, 
689 F.2d 752, 754 (7thCir.1982) (“[I]dentification can be inferred from all the 
facts and circumstances that are in evidence.”). 
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 Here, there was significantly more than “some evidence” to establish 
that Defendant shot at Stephen. See Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177 (emphasis 
added). Defendant was seen driving his girlfriend’s stolen car—a red Chevy 
Malibu, Utah license plate number E824JR with a yellow baby-on-board sign 
in the back window—the day before. R627-29. When the officer tried to pull 
Defendant over, he fled. R632. 
 The next day, multiple witnesses watched that same car—a red Chevy 
Malibu with the yellow baby-on-board sign in the back window—ram 
Stephen’s silver Chrysler 300 and then saw the Malibu’s driver open fire at 
Stephen. R576,578-79,586-89,640-42,604. Witnesses watched the Malibu flee 
the scene. R589, 605. One witness followed the fleeing Malibu and reported 
its location to 911 dispatch. Id. That witness also saw one of the Malibu’s 
headlights fly off and the Malibu’s driver stop to retrieve the car’s front 
bumper after it fell off, and place it in the backseat. R605-06. 
 Soon after the shooting, Officer Watson found Defendant driving the 
Malibu with extensive front-end damage. R703-04. Defendant then fled from 
officers, leading them on a 22-mile car chase. R705-18,726-50; SE46-49,55-56; 
see also R668 (time from 911 call to arrest was 2 hours). Defendant then 
abandoned the Malibu in the middle of the road and led officers on a short 
foot chase. R751-56; SE56.  
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 The Malibu that Defendant left in the middle of the road was 
Defendant’s girlfriend’s car and matched the Malibu involved in shooting. 
Indeed, the Malibu stuck out. It was an “older model,” red, with a baby-on-
board yellow sign in the rear window. R703; SE20-22. It was missing a 
bumper and a headlight just like the damage that eyewitnesses to the 
shooting and chase described. SE22. The headlight was found at the 
intersection near the shooting and the bumper was in the backseat—just as 
eyewitness Henry observed and testified. R606,653,780. The Malibu’s front 
end was crushed in with silver paint transfer. R779; SE23,33-37. Stephen’s car 
was silver. R423. And Stephen’s car had red paint transfer where it was 
rammed. R1107; SE1e. Additionally, glass shards found in the backseat of the 
Malibu matched glass shards recovered from the scene. R833,838. 
 Witnesses saw only one person in the Malibu during the shooting and 
subsequent chase, and all agreed that the person they saw matched 
Defendant’s description—a heavily tattooed Hispanic male with very short 
hair, a moustache and the word “eighteen” tattooed on his upper lip. R572-
73,,604,640,703. Officers positively identified the driver of that same Malibu 
as Defendant. R704,733. And no one saw any other person driving the 
Malibu.  
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 The identification was not materially undermined when Henry did not 
choose Defendant’s photo from the photo array. See Howell, 649 P.2d at 96 
(“existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not 
warrant disturbing the jury’s verdict”) (quotation and citation omitted). 
Henry testified that she was not “100 percent” sure that the person she picked 
was the shooter. R608-09. Rather, she testified that the person she picked 
merely “resemble[d]” the shooter. R609. Henry was never face to face with 
Defendant. And nothing in the record undermined her testimony that the 
second photo at least resembled Defendant as he appeared on the day of the 
shooting.  
 Indeed, the photo lineup was not created using the latest photo of 
Defendant. It was created by a computer program that uses facial recognition 
software to generate a lineup from driver license photos. R1015-16. As the 
prosecutor explained, the photo Henry picked as the driver looked more like 
Defendant at the time of the shooting than the photo of Defendant in the 
photo array. R1136-37.  
 In any event, the jury saw Defendant, saw Defendant at the time of his 
arrest in the officer’s body cam video, and saw the lineup. SE50a,55. The jury 
also heard that Henry did not identify Defendant in the photo lineup. R608-
09. They could weigh that evidence themselves and choose to disregard it or 
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give it whatever weight they deemed appropriate. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, 
¶67, 27 P.3d 1115 (“It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the 
evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”). 
 Additionally, Defendant’s DNA linked him to both the car and the 
shooting. R940-65; SE51-52. The shooter fired ten rounds from a 40-caliber 
gun at Stephen. R1110. On the driver’s side floorboard of the Malibu that 
Defendant had stolen from his girlfriend, the crime scene technician found 
ten spent rounds and two bullets. R781,836-37; SE28-32a. The ten spent 
rounds and one of the live bullets all came from a 40-caliber gun—the same 
type of gun used to shoot Stephen. R781,836-37,1110.  
 The shell casings were tested for touch DNA. R940-65; SE51-52. 
Defendant’s DNA was found on at least one of the casings. R965,975; SE51-
52. 
 Defendant claims that the DNA evidence is unreliable because the test 
could not discern how Defendant’s DNA got on the casings. Br.Aplt.15. 
Defendant argues that his DNA could have been on the casings simply 
because he was driving the car and the casing rolled around in the car, not 
because he loaded the gun. Id. But there was no evidence to support 
Defendant’s theory that his DNA could end up on the spent casings simply 
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because he was in the car. Indeed, Defendant does not cite to any record 
evidence for that proposition. See Br.Aplt.15.  
 In any event, Defendant presented this theory to the jury. R504, 
915,928,1121-23. The jury heard testimony about how touch DNA can be 
transferred and that Defendant’s DNA would be in the car because he was 
driving it.. R904-928. The jury nevertheless rejected Defendant’s theory. The 
jury was well-within its discretion to do so. See Howell, 649 P.2d at 97 (Utah 
1982) (after trial court admits evidence, “[i]t is within the exclusive province 
of the jury to judge the ... weight of the evidence”). 
 Additionally, Defendant’s flight from police was further evidence that 
he was the one who shot at Stephen. State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 38-39 (Utah 
1987), overturned on other grounds by State v. Robertson, 2017 UT 27,  ---P.3d ---; 
State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983). Defendant offered no innocent 
explanation for running from police or possessing the Malibu. See R994. 
 Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, all of this evdience 
was more than sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that 
Defendant was the shooter. See Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177.  
 Regardless, Defendant argues that the evidence “raises only a 
speculative possibility of guilt.” Br. Aplt. 16. Citing evidence that another 
person’s fingerprints were on the bumper, that Henry did not choose 
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Defendant’s photo from the array, and that Defendantallegedly lacked any 
motive to attack the victim, Defendant argues that “stonger circumstantial 
evidence pointed to innocence.” Br.Aplt.13-16.  
 But this argument misstates the sufficiency standard. Defendant views 
the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to him, 
not the verdict. Defendant’s “personal view of events does not … render the 
State’s evidence ‘sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable’ so as to 
warrant a reversal.” State v. Johnson, 2015 UT App 312, ¶12, 365 P.3d 730 
(cleaned up); see Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶177 (this Court “reviews the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the verdict”). 
 None of the evidence that Defendant relies on is so significant, either 
individually or collectively, to counter the substantial evidence identifying 
Defendant as the shooter. See State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278 (Utah App 
1998)(“[T]he existence of one or more alternate reasonable hypotheses does 
not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that Defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”);  see also United States v. Mains, 33 F.3d 1222, 
1228 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Although it is possible to hypothesize from 
circumstantial evidence that another individual may have possessed the 
cocaine found at the apartment, the evidence required to support a verdict 
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need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and need 
not negate all possibilities except guilt.”).  
 Thus, Defendant’s claim fails because ample evidence supported the 
jury’s conclusion that he  was the shooter.  
B. Ample evidence supported the trial court’s possession-of-a 
dangerous-weapon-by-a-restricted-person verdict.  
 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a bench trial, this 
Court must affirm unless, in light of the whole record, it is convinced that the 
verdict is “against the clear weight of the evidence, or if [it] otherwise reaches 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made” State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). A finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence if it is “without adequate evidentiary support,’” and a mistake has 
been made if the trial court’s finding is “‘induced by an erroneous view of the 
law.” Id. (cleaned up). Although an appellate court does not view the 
evidence and all inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, id., it does owe a “duty of deference to findings of 
fact” and must forbear “disturbing the ‘close call.’” In re Z.D., 2006 UT 54, 
¶33, 147 P.3d 401. Thus, “in those instances in which the trial court’s findings 
include inferences drawn from the evidence,” this Court must “not take issue 
with those inferences unless the logic upon which their extrapolation from 
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the evidence is based is so flawed as to render the inference clearly 
erroneous.” Glew v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 2007 UT 56, ¶18, 181 P.3d 791. 
 Defendant has failed to show clear error in the trial court’s verdict. As 
explained above, the State provided sufficient evidence to prove that 
Defendant was the person who shot at Stephen, and thus, that he possessed 
a dangerous weapon as a restricted person. See Supra I.A. 
II. 
The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion by sua 
sponte dismissing the sleeping juror.  
 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by sua sponte dismissing the 
sleeping juror without first questioning her. Br.Aplt.16-22. He also argues 
that dismissal of the juror prejudiced him. Id.  
 Defendant’s claim fails. On this record, Defendant cannot show 
prejudice. Nor can he show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion 
because the trial court was not required to question the juror before 
dismissing her.  
 A. Defendant has not shown prejudice.  
 Relying on State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987), Defendant 
argues that the proper prejudice standard is an outcome-determinative 
standard: whether “without the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result.” Br.Aplt.20. Defendant is wrong.  
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 Knight is wholly inapplicable. Knight applies its outcome-
determinative prejudice standard to a prosecutor’s discovery duties—an 
entirely different question. 734 P.2d at 913-23. Indeed, Defendant cites to no 
case involving sleeping jurors, or a trial court dismissing a juror, that uses his 
proposed  prejudice standard. 
 And for good reason. Both the United States Supreme Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court have rejected the prejudice standard Defendant 
proposes.  
 In Ross v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
Defendant who claims that his right to an impartial jury was denied must 
show that a juror was either biased or incompetent. 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). The 
Court explained that  a defendant’s Sixth- Amendment right to be tried by an 
impartial jury is not infringed merely because, absent the removal of a 
particular juror, he would have been tried by a different jury panel. See id. 87. 
(“Although … failure to remove [a juror] may have resulted in a jury panel 
different from that which would otherwise have decided the case, we do not 
accept the argument that this possibility mandates reversal.”). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court recognized that a defendant does not have the right to a jury 
of any particular composition, but the right only to an impartial jury. Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975); see also United States v. Taylor, 663 
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F.Supp.2d 1157, 1162-63 (D.N.M. 2009). “[T]he Constitution presupposes that 
a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial, 
regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the 
jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their 
sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case.” Lockhart v. 
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986). 
 Our supreme court agrees. In State v. Menzies, Menzies argued that the 
trial court erred when it did not remove jurors for cause and forced him to 
exercise his peremptory challenges. 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) superseded 
on other grounds by constitutional amendment, UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12, as 
recognized in State v. Goins, 2017 UT 61, 423 P.3d 1236. The supreme court 
held that to prove prejudice Menzies had to show that a biased or 
incompetent juror sat. Id. 400.  
 Thus, to prevail on his claim that the trial court erroneously dismissed 
the sleeping juror, Defendant must show that a biased or incompetent juror 
sat. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88; Menzies, 889 P.2d at 398. On this record, he cannot. 
 Nothing in the record supports that the alternate juror, Juror 22, was 
biased or incompetent. During voir dire, Juror 22 stated that he had a high 
school education, worked as project engineer completing contracts, quality 
control, and construction management, read cooking magazines, outdoor 
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magazines like American Rifleman, and Fox News, and was a “pretty 
talented barbecue chef.” R489-90.  
 Juror 22 did not know anyone associated with the case or anyone in 
law enforcement. R496-500,503-04. He had not heard anything about the case 
before becoming a juror. R511. He did not have any hardships that prevented 
him from serving as a juror. R507-12. He said that he could follow the jury 
rules and the law. Id. And he said that he would base his verdict on the 
evidence presented. R511-12.  
 No record evidence shows that Juror 22 did not uphold his duties as a 
juror. Indeed, it is presumed that he did. See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 
234-35 (2000) (jurors presumed to follow instructions) Richardson v. Marsh, 
481 U.S. 200 , 211 (1987) (same); see also ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF 
HARMLESS ERROR 73-74 (1970) (footnote omitted), quoted in Connecticut v. 
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85, n. 14 (1983) (“[W]e must assume that juries for the 
most part understand and faithfully follow instructions. The concept of a fair 
trial encompasses a decision by a tribunal that has understood and applied 
the law to all material issues in the case.”).  
 At bottom, Defendant’s quarrel is not that Juror 22 was biased or 
incompetent. His quarrel is that Juror 22 was not as educated as Juror 16 and 
read different materials than Juror 16. Br.Aplt.22. But that does not prove that 
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Juror 22 was biased or incompetent. Indeed, if Defendant was so concerned 
about Juror 22 he should have challenged Juror 22 for cause or exercised one 
of his preemptory challenges. He did not. See R1199. 
 Because no record evidence proves that Juror 22 was biased or 
incompetent, Defendant’s claim fails.  
 B. The trial court did not clearly abuse its discretion by not 
questioning the sleeping juror before dismissing her.  
 “One principle predominates” Utah appellate cases discussing 
sleeping jurors: “discretion.” State v. Marquina, 2018 UT App 219, ¶29, --- P.3d 
---. In Marquina, ¶26, Marquina argued that the trial court plainly erred when 
it did not sua sponte question a sleeping juror. See id. ¶26. This Court rejected 
Marquina’s claim, recognizing that “Utah law does not require a court to 
conduct sua sponte a voir dire after a report of a sleepy juror.” Id. ¶34. This 
Court explained that “[h]andling a sleeping juror is ‘so peculiarly within the 
observation, province, and discretion of the trial court’” that this Court 
“‘should not interfere” with a trial court’s ruling unless there is a clear abuse 
of discretion. Id. ¶29 (quoting Mellor, 272 P. at 639). And this Court recognized 
that the trial judge is in the best position to “gauge” a juror’s capacity to serve. 
Id. ¶29 (quoting State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983)).  
  Defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its broad 
discretion. The trial court was in the best position to determine that Juror 16 
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was not capable of serving as a juror. See Utah R. Crim. Proc. 17(g) (“[I[f a 
juror become disqualified during trial … the case shall proceed using the 
alternate juror.”). The trial court and its staff observed Juror 16 sleep through 
significant parts of the first two days of a four-day trial. R743-44,790-91. On 
the first two days of trial, both parties presented opening statements and the 
State presented most of its case-in-chief, including testimony from the victim, 
the civilian eye-witnesses, and four police officers. R555-793.  
 The trial court observed that Juror 16 did not merely “doze[] off for a 
minute.” R791; cf. Mellor, 272 P.at 639 (trial court did not err when it did not 
grant a new trial after a juror “several times dozed off at short or brief 
intervals” but was “not unconscious”). Instead, the trial court observed Juror 
16 miss “significant parts of the trial” and “sleep through testimony that 
ordinarily would keep a person’s attention.” R743-44,790. Juror 16, therefore, 
missed material testimony that would have affected her ability to render a 
verdict.  
 Given this, the trial court choose to dismiss Juror 16 without first 
questioning her about what she believed she missed while sleeping, as 
defense counsel had requested. The court explained that because Juror 16 
missed material information, “it doesn’t matter” if she knew that she missed 
parts of the trial or not, the “fact is that” both the court and the court’s staff 
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“observed her miss[] significant parts of the trial.” R791. And the trial court 
acted well-within its discretion to dismiss the juror on this basis. Nothing 
requires the trial court to question a juror, especially when, as here, the trial 
court saw, and its staff confirmed, that the juror had slept through significant 
parts of the trial. See Marquina, 2018 UT App 219, ¶29. Thus, the trial court 
did not err when it dismissed Juror 16 without first questioning her.  
 Relying on Mellor and State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658 (Utah  1974), 
Defendant argues that because counsel asked the trial court to question Juror 
16 before dismissing her, the trial court was duty bound to question her. 
Br.Aplt.20.  
 In Mellor, the supreme court held the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by not dismissing a juror who “at brief intervals, did doze off, or 
fall asleep,” but who nevertheless heard and “fully comprehended the 
substance of the testimony of the witness.” 272 P. at 639. And in Pace, the 
supreme court held that the trial court did not error when it did not dismiss 
a sleeping juror because the trial court personally “observed the whole jury” 
and saw the sleeping juror wake up before it “had a chance to call it to the 
[juror’s] attention.” 527 P.2d at 659. Thus, neither Mellor or Pace requires that 
the trial court question a juror that it observes sleeping before dismissing her. 
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 This Court has agreed. In Marquina, this Court rejected Defendant’s 
interpretation that Mellor and Pace required a trial court to question a sleeping 
juror before dismissing her. 2018 UT App 219, ¶¶30-31. This Court explained 
that Mellor and Pace “established that trial courts, when presented with 
reports of sleeping jurors, are given wide discretion in how to respond” and 
the “supreme court did not announce a rule or template trial courts must 
follow whenever they are confronted with reports of a sleeping juror.” Id. 
¶31.  
 Defendant’s reliance on out-of-jurisdiction authority that purports to 
require questioning a sleeping juror is no more persuasive. See Br.Aplt.19-22. 
As this Court recognized in Marquina, such authorities are non-binding and 
“Utah law does not require a court to conduct sua sponte a voir dire after a 
report of a sleepy juror.” 2018 UT App 219, ¶34. And even though defense 
counsel asked the trial court to question the juror here, that questioning 
would have been fruitless where the trial court saw, and its staff confirmed, 
that the juror had missed significant portions of the trial.  
 The trial court therefore had no duty to question the sleeping juror 
before dismissing her even though defense counsel requested it. See 
Marquina, 2018 UT App 219, ¶29; Mellor, 272 P. at 639. Thus, the trial court 
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did not clearly abuse its discretion when it sua sponte dismissed her without 
questioning her.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the forgoing reasons, the State asks that this Court affirm 
Defendant’s convictions.  
 Respectfully submitted on February 28, 2019. 
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